Chasing a mirage

After 35 years of civil war and 15 years of the US led-intervention, prospects for peace in Afghanistan are bleak. The much- touted Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process is a mirage. It is apparent that the vicious cycle of violence will continue unabated for the foreseeable future. The recent death of the Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Pakistan seems inconsequential. The Taliban are not wilting under the pressure enough to bring them to the negotiating table. Overall, the balance of power remains unchanged and the military status quo persists. The principal reason that peace in not on the cards in Afghanistan are the divergent goals and objectives of the warring parties and the external players involved in the conflict. For instance, Pakistan’s incomprehensible Afghan policy is a serious impediment to bringing peace to Afghanistan. In a nutshell, Pakistani is fine with the joys of Taliban rule in Afghanistan but does not want the same for itself. It is opposed to the enforcement of harsh Taliban religious laws in Pakistan but quite satisfied if they are imposed in Afghanistan. It battles the Pakistan Taliban, but provides safe haven and logistical support to its ideological cousin, the Afghan Taliban. It whines over lost sovereignty when the US frustrated with the lack of success in the peace talks takes out a Taliban leader on its territory. Clearly, confidence-building measures and incentives will not bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. They are unlikely to renounce their objective of regaining political power and territorial control. The Taliban underpinned by a hard-line ideology are on a quest to re-establish the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. Sharing political power in a democratic system would be an anathema and would dilute support for the movement. Therefore, it is imperative that other parties particularly Pakistan do more to end Taliban intransigence. At this moment, there is a glaring lack of trust between the purported allies Pakistan and the US, who are the main external players in the Afghan conflict. Neither the US’s fight-talk nor Pakistan’s talk-talk strategies seem to be working in Afghanistan. The US strategy seeks to weaken the Taliban sufficiently to allow the Afghan people to safely reject it; develop Afghan security forces so that Afghans can defend themselves as US troops leave; and, through an enhanced civilian effort, help the Afghan government sustain the support of its people by providing basic services. However, the Taliban have been resilient, reminding one of the Viet Cong in Indo-China, as they keep coming back despite heavy losses and technological disadvantages. The Taliban strategy of wearing down the enemy and re-capturing lost territory, even holding it for short periods, seems to be working. On the other hand, the National Unity Government led by Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah appears weak. The government is dogged by allegations of corruption and incompetence. It is sincere and anxious to make peace but it cannot seem to get rid of the tag of being a US ‘puppet’. It can try to do all it can to create an environment conducive to reconciliation. But as long as the Taliban sense that government will collapse once the US leaves they will play the wait-and-see game. For obvious security reasons, government cannot agree to the Taliban’s main precondition for peace talks, which is the complete withdrawal of US-led foreign forces from Afghanistan. Many Afghans would oppose a return to harsh Taliban rule despite the shortcomings of the Ghani government. Some progress has been made on women’s rights, freedom of expression, education and democratic values that the Taliban do not share. Under the Taliban rule, girls were prohibited from attending school; women were entirely shunned from public life; boys were forbidden to play sports; music was banned. To paraphrase the author John Steinbeck, “All conflict is a symptom of man’s failure as a thinking animal.” In Afghanistan, all parties must think their way out of the quagmire. Some obvious approaches come to mind: 1) All countries agree to act against the common threat emanating from the network of like-minded terrorist groups in the region 2) Pakistan is persuaded to dropping the Taliban as a useful hedge in a post-US Afghanistan 3) the US accepts an Afghan government that incorporates the Taliban 4) Afghanistan ensures that its territory is not used against its neighbours 5) Political reforms in Afghanistan grant a greater voice to a broader range of Afghan interests, such as local and provincial leaders, political parties, and parliament. The Afghan government needs a wider base of political support than it currently enjoys and its institutions are able to deliver 6) Taliban are convinced that their dream of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan is unrealistic and will remain unfulfilled. It should be made clear to the Taliban that if they persist in their campaign, they would face the full military might of Pakistan and the US on both sides of the porous border.

Slide into extremism

Other countries that are divided by religious extremism can learn from Pakistan that entrenching religious dogmatism and intransigence has devastating consequences for a country’s future. Once bigotry becomes institutionalised, reversing it is no easy endeavour, particularly in the face of violent opposition. Society is easily manipulated by those who want to impose their own views in the name of religion. It has been suggested that extremism in Pakistan is a natural consequence of the mobilisation of broad support for a separate state from a religious platform, using the rhetoric of secularism and democracy but relying on the symbols of Islam to invoke support for an avowedly Muslim state, founded by Muslims for Muslims. But more likely, extremism has more to do with the poor choices made since the country’s creation: lack of consensus around national identity, deviation from the early moderate path to nation building and overemphasis on the public role for religion in state and social affairs at the expense of pluralism and democracy. Certainly, the role of religion in political and civil life has had a defining role in the political development of the nation. Had there been less emphasis on religion from the ruling, elite-dominated state in Pakistan, the public and religious groups would not have become vociferous in demanding the establishment of a theocratic state. And religious groups and parties would not have gained so much street power and public exposure. The roots of state support for Islamist policies can be traced back to the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which created the union between religion and state. It was followed by the 1956 Constitution that stated that the president of the country must be a Muslim and that no law in the country could be passed that goes against the teachings of the Holy Quran and sunnah. The 1962 Constitution established the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a body that states that child marriages are not un-Islamic, speaks out against the Domestic Violence Bill and does not support seeking consent from the first wife when it comes to a second marriage. Furthermore, the creation in 1980 of the Federal Sharia Court institutionalised Islamic tenets and laid the foundations for theocratic rule in the country. With state support, this body used its religious authority to examine existing Pakistani laws for their obedience to Islamic teachings. Consequently, the culture of Islamisation and adherence to an exclusive identity of Islam pervades Pakistani political and social institutions. Moreover, between 1980 and 1986, there were amendments to the blasphemy laws that originated in British-controlled India in 1860 to deter the religious persecution of heterogeneous groups. These laws are inherently biased and discriminatory, have induced sectarian violence and have silenced honest political discourse in the country. These laws continue to permit shocking abuses against minorities as well as worsen radicalisation. Militant groups exploit these draconian laws to legitimise their moral authority and galvanise flourishing conservative Islamic groups already sympathetic to the jihadi cause. More importantly, the laws run contrary to the spirit of justice and respect towards other faiths under the precepts of Islam. Unfortunately, the state is scared to repeal these highly politicised laws anticipating a volatile backlash by conservatives. This could bolster the legitimacy of militant religious groups. In summary, egregious laws, state abdication and connivance have kindled the fire of extremism and undermine judicial authority by legitimising vigilantism. This has institutionalised socio-religious intolerance and violent extremism, and encouraged the spread of certain religious ideas in society such as blasphemy, apostasy, jihad and martyrdom, transforming the otherwise moderate fabric of Pakistani society. Moreover, the absolutist and exclusionary tendencies within (Sunni) Islam have had a divisive and authoritarian effect on Pakistan’s polity. The fallout within the country has been devastating, as witnessed in the lynching of blasphemy suspects, sectarian killings, the sacking of localities with minority populations, murder of human rights’ activists and the bombing of religious processions and places of worship. At this juncture, religious intolerance across Pakistan has reached unprecedented levels. Weak governance, widespread grievances, repression and the lack of a flourishing civil society have exacerbated the challenge. Hard choices have to be made to combat and reverse the mindset and ideology of those who are defying the state, and attempt to impose their narrow worldview under the garb of Islam. A Turkish proverb says that one bad lesson is better than 1,000 good advices. One can only hope that, having made bad choices in the past, the Pakistani establishment will know better and manage the danger of extremism through deliberation and persuasion rather than relying entirely on a military solution. The state should resist the temptation to define ‘God-fearing, good Muslims’. It must accept that the mixing of state and religion has been counter-productive. Rather than imposing Islamic law, what is needed is a spiritual and cultural path that fosters ethics in society rather than a theocratic state. Pakistan can learn from the success of multi-religious societies that advocate a secular democracy incorporating a strong policy of religious pluralism.

The Pak US conundrum

Charles de Gaulle once said “You may be sure that the Americans will commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are beyond imagination”. Well, the “stupid” Americans spearheaded the liberation of France, allowed the Free French Army to lead the march into Paris contributing to De Gaulle being declared a national hero eventually becoming President of France.

Similarly, the Americans have pumped over $ 45 billion in direct military and economic aid to Pakistan since Independence, $ 21 billion since 9/11 alone in effect making a huge contribution to stabilizing an impoverished nation. In return almost daily, Pakistani leaders like Imran Khan and Syed Munawar Hasan among others, accuse the United States at minimum of murder, genocide and meddling in internal affairs. This shows that stupidity is not restricted to a particular nation or people.

To be sure Americans are not saints and have committed their share of stupid acts all over the world including in Pakistan, latest being the alleged murder of three Pakistani citizens in Lahore by “Rambo” Davis and his support team. We also know that previous American support for military dictatorships in Pakistan has contributed to weaknesses in the country’s civilian democratic institutions arguably better placed to fight intolerance and extremism.

Perhaps both Pakistan and the United States need to reconsider their bilateral relations in context of Mr. M.A. Jinnah’s broadcast talk to the people of the USA in February 1948 when he said: Our foreign policy is one of the friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings, and are prepared to make our contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I think that a great deal of the mistrust and animosity between Pakistan and the United States stem from cultural differences exacerbated by poor communication which sometimes leads to serious misunderstandings. It would be fair to say that Pakistanis are an overly emotional and sensitive people for whom the Americans can come across as insensitive and overbearing! The fact that Pakistan is an economic basket case and reliance on US aid to stay afloat will always mean an unequal partnership heavily skewed in favour of the United States.

I am reminded of an amusing incident when in the early 60s, US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) on a goodwill mission visited Karachi and met Bashir Ahmad in a group of camel drivers on a roadside. LBJ pressed the flesh even patting the camels and used a phrase he had regularly said in his travels, “You all come to Washington and see us sometime” but was completely surprised when Bashir accepted his offer. With the press hot on his heels after the acceptance, LBJ took advantage of the People-to-People program to fund Bashir’s travel expenses.

Evidently, President Kennedy (JFK) jokingly noted about the visit, “I don’t know how Lyndon does it. If I had done that, there would have been camel dung all over the White House lawn.” This “politically incorrect” remark from JFK would have caused a furor in Pakistan today!

A Pakistani journalist covering Bashir’s US visit described it as “don’t conquer a country, don’t conquer a government. If you wish to conquer, conquer the hearts of the people.” Finally, at the end of his stay, as a gesture of further goodwill, LBJ made arrangements for Bashir to visit Mecca on his way back to Pakistan, this act of friendship apparently bought tears to the eyes of the destitute camel driver.

Well in the present charged environment, the Americans can’t hope to “conquer the hearts” of the people of Pakistan. LBJ’s charming Southern drawl and nice gestures may have worked in Bashir’s naïve Pakistan of the 60s but it is impossible to see similar gestures working on a suspicious and insecure Pakistani populace of today.

So let’s agree that Pakistan and the United States can’t be friends but have only shared interests. Firstly, that the ISI fully cooperate with the CIA in the joint fight against disrupting international terrorism and arresting and interrogating terrorist suspects, nicely as possible please!

In return, the US should recognize Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and accept the fact that the Pakistan army can’t be seen to be a glorified regional police force for the US military.
Secondly, the US should strongly encourage India Pakistan dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue and jumpstart trade between the two countries. Genuine peace efforts and trade will hopefully shape the psyche of the Pakistani ruling-elite and intelligentsia away from a costly arms race towards investment in education, health and welfare.

Finally, support for democracy in Pakistan should be the cornerstone of US foreign policy. No more should the United States be identified with supporting dictators for short term expediency. In turn, Pakistani democratic governments should guarantee the rule of law, an end to corruption and economic growth and progress for all. Hopefully, over time these shared interests will lead to a reduction in frictions between Pakistan and the United States.