Chasing a mirage

After 35 years of civil war and 15 years of the US led-intervention, prospects for peace in Afghanistan are bleak. The much- touted Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process is a mirage. It is apparent that the vicious cycle of violence will continue unabated for the foreseeable future. The recent death of the Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Pakistan seems inconsequential. The Taliban are not wilting under the pressure enough to bring them to the negotiating table. Overall, the balance of power remains unchanged and the military status quo persists. The principal reason that peace in not on the cards in Afghanistan are the divergent goals and objectives of the warring parties and the external players involved in the conflict. For instance, Pakistan’s incomprehensible Afghan policy is a serious impediment to bringing peace to Afghanistan. In a nutshell, Pakistani is fine with the joys of Taliban rule in Afghanistan but does not want the same for itself. It is opposed to the enforcement of harsh Taliban religious laws in Pakistan but quite satisfied if they are imposed in Afghanistan. It battles the Pakistan Taliban, but provides safe haven and logistical support to its ideological cousin, the Afghan Taliban. It whines over lost sovereignty when the US frustrated with the lack of success in the peace talks takes out a Taliban leader on its territory. Clearly, confidence-building measures and incentives will not bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. They are unlikely to renounce their objective of regaining political power and territorial control. The Taliban underpinned by a hard-line ideology are on a quest to re-establish the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. Sharing political power in a democratic system would be an anathema and would dilute support for the movement. Therefore, it is imperative that other parties particularly Pakistan do more to end Taliban intransigence. At this moment, there is a glaring lack of trust between the purported allies Pakistan and the US, who are the main external players in the Afghan conflict. Neither the US’s fight-talk nor Pakistan’s talk-talk strategies seem to be working in Afghanistan. The US strategy seeks to weaken the Taliban sufficiently to allow the Afghan people to safely reject it; develop Afghan security forces so that Afghans can defend themselves as US troops leave; and, through an enhanced civilian effort, help the Afghan government sustain the support of its people by providing basic services. However, the Taliban have been resilient, reminding one of the Viet Cong in Indo-China, as they keep coming back despite heavy losses and technological disadvantages. The Taliban strategy of wearing down the enemy and re-capturing lost territory, even holding it for short periods, seems to be working. On the other hand, the National Unity Government led by Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah appears weak. The government is dogged by allegations of corruption and incompetence. It is sincere and anxious to make peace but it cannot seem to get rid of the tag of being a US ‘puppet’. It can try to do all it can to create an environment conducive to reconciliation. But as long as the Taliban sense that government will collapse once the US leaves they will play the wait-and-see game. For obvious security reasons, government cannot agree to the Taliban’s main precondition for peace talks, which is the complete withdrawal of US-led foreign forces from Afghanistan. Many Afghans would oppose a return to harsh Taliban rule despite the shortcomings of the Ghani government. Some progress has been made on women’s rights, freedom of expression, education and democratic values that the Taliban do not share. Under the Taliban rule, girls were prohibited from attending school; women were entirely shunned from public life; boys were forbidden to play sports; music was banned. To paraphrase the author John Steinbeck, “All conflict is a symptom of man’s failure as a thinking animal.” In Afghanistan, all parties must think their way out of the quagmire. Some obvious approaches come to mind: 1) All countries agree to act against the common threat emanating from the network of like-minded terrorist groups in the region 2) Pakistan is persuaded to dropping the Taliban as a useful hedge in a post-US Afghanistan 3) the US accepts an Afghan government that incorporates the Taliban 4) Afghanistan ensures that its territory is not used against its neighbours 5) Political reforms in Afghanistan grant a greater voice to a broader range of Afghan interests, such as local and provincial leaders, political parties, and parliament. The Afghan government needs a wider base of political support than it currently enjoys and its institutions are able to deliver 6) Taliban are convinced that their dream of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan is unrealistic and will remain unfulfilled. It should be made clear to the Taliban that if they persist in their campaign, they would face the full military might of Pakistan and the US on both sides of the porous border.

The Pak US conundrum

Charles de Gaulle once said “You may be sure that the Americans will commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are beyond imagination”. Well, the “stupid” Americans spearheaded the liberation of France, allowed the Free French Army to lead the march into Paris contributing to De Gaulle being declared a national hero eventually becoming President of France.

Similarly, the Americans have pumped over $ 45 billion in direct military and economic aid to Pakistan since Independence, $ 21 billion since 9/11 alone in effect making a huge contribution to stabilizing an impoverished nation. In return almost daily, Pakistani leaders like Imran Khan and Syed Munawar Hasan among others, accuse the United States at minimum of murder, genocide and meddling in internal affairs. This shows that stupidity is not restricted to a particular nation or people.

To be sure Americans are not saints and have committed their share of stupid acts all over the world including in Pakistan, latest being the alleged murder of three Pakistani citizens in Lahore by “Rambo” Davis and his support team. We also know that previous American support for military dictatorships in Pakistan has contributed to weaknesses in the country’s civilian democratic institutions arguably better placed to fight intolerance and extremism.

Perhaps both Pakistan and the United States need to reconsider their bilateral relations in context of Mr. M.A. Jinnah’s broadcast talk to the people of the USA in February 1948 when he said: Our foreign policy is one of the friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings, and are prepared to make our contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I think that a great deal of the mistrust and animosity between Pakistan and the United States stem from cultural differences exacerbated by poor communication which sometimes leads to serious misunderstandings. It would be fair to say that Pakistanis are an overly emotional and sensitive people for whom the Americans can come across as insensitive and overbearing! The fact that Pakistan is an economic basket case and reliance on US aid to stay afloat will always mean an unequal partnership heavily skewed in favour of the United States.

I am reminded of an amusing incident when in the early 60s, US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) on a goodwill mission visited Karachi and met Bashir Ahmad in a group of camel drivers on a roadside. LBJ pressed the flesh even patting the camels and used a phrase he had regularly said in his travels, “You all come to Washington and see us sometime” but was completely surprised when Bashir accepted his offer. With the press hot on his heels after the acceptance, LBJ took advantage of the People-to-People program to fund Bashir’s travel expenses.

Evidently, President Kennedy (JFK) jokingly noted about the visit, “I don’t know how Lyndon does it. If I had done that, there would have been camel dung all over the White House lawn.” This “politically incorrect” remark from JFK would have caused a furor in Pakistan today!

A Pakistani journalist covering Bashir’s US visit described it as “don’t conquer a country, don’t conquer a government. If you wish to conquer, conquer the hearts of the people.” Finally, at the end of his stay, as a gesture of further goodwill, LBJ made arrangements for Bashir to visit Mecca on his way back to Pakistan, this act of friendship apparently bought tears to the eyes of the destitute camel driver.

Well in the present charged environment, the Americans can’t hope to “conquer the hearts” of the people of Pakistan. LBJ’s charming Southern drawl and nice gestures may have worked in Bashir’s naïve Pakistan of the 60s but it is impossible to see similar gestures working on a suspicious and insecure Pakistani populace of today.

So let’s agree that Pakistan and the United States can’t be friends but have only shared interests. Firstly, that the ISI fully cooperate with the CIA in the joint fight against disrupting international terrorism and arresting and interrogating terrorist suspects, nicely as possible please!

In return, the US should recognize Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and accept the fact that the Pakistan army can’t be seen to be a glorified regional police force for the US military.
Secondly, the US should strongly encourage India Pakistan dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue and jumpstart trade between the two countries. Genuine peace efforts and trade will hopefully shape the psyche of the Pakistani ruling-elite and intelligentsia away from a costly arms race towards investment in education, health and welfare.

Finally, support for democracy in Pakistan should be the cornerstone of US foreign policy. No more should the United States be identified with supporting dictators for short term expediency. In turn, Pakistani democratic governments should guarantee the rule of law, an end to corruption and economic growth and progress for all. Hopefully, over time these shared interests will lead to a reduction in frictions between Pakistan and the United States.