Slide into extremism

Other countries that are divided by religious extremism can learn from Pakistan that entrenching religious dogmatism and intransigence has devastating consequences for a country’s future. Once bigotry becomes institutionalised, reversing it is no easy endeavour, particularly in the face of violent opposition. Society is easily manipulated by those who want to impose their own views in the name of religion. It has been suggested that extremism in Pakistan is a natural consequence of the mobilisation of broad support for a separate state from a religious platform, using the rhetoric of secularism and democracy but relying on the symbols of Islam to invoke support for an avowedly Muslim state, founded by Muslims for Muslims. But more likely, extremism has more to do with the poor choices made since the country’s creation: lack of consensus around national identity, deviation from the early moderate path to nation building and overemphasis on the public role for religion in state and social affairs at the expense of pluralism and democracy. Certainly, the role of religion in political and civil life has had a defining role in the political development of the nation. Had there been less emphasis on religion from the ruling, elite-dominated state in Pakistan, the public and religious groups would not have become vociferous in demanding the establishment of a theocratic state. And religious groups and parties would not have gained so much street power and public exposure. The roots of state support for Islamist policies can be traced back to the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which created the union between religion and state. It was followed by the 1956 Constitution that stated that the president of the country must be a Muslim and that no law in the country could be passed that goes against the teachings of the Holy Quran and sunnah. The 1962 Constitution established the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a body that states that child marriages are not un-Islamic, speaks out against the Domestic Violence Bill and does not support seeking consent from the first wife when it comes to a second marriage. Furthermore, the creation in 1980 of the Federal Sharia Court institutionalised Islamic tenets and laid the foundations for theocratic rule in the country. With state support, this body used its religious authority to examine existing Pakistani laws for their obedience to Islamic teachings. Consequently, the culture of Islamisation and adherence to an exclusive identity of Islam pervades Pakistani political and social institutions. Moreover, between 1980 and 1986, there were amendments to the blasphemy laws that originated in British-controlled India in 1860 to deter the religious persecution of heterogeneous groups. These laws are inherently biased and discriminatory, have induced sectarian violence and have silenced honest political discourse in the country. These laws continue to permit shocking abuses against minorities as well as worsen radicalisation. Militant groups exploit these draconian laws to legitimise their moral authority and galvanise flourishing conservative Islamic groups already sympathetic to the jihadi cause. More importantly, the laws run contrary to the spirit of justice and respect towards other faiths under the precepts of Islam. Unfortunately, the state is scared to repeal these highly politicised laws anticipating a volatile backlash by conservatives. This could bolster the legitimacy of militant religious groups. In summary, egregious laws, state abdication and connivance have kindled the fire of extremism and undermine judicial authority by legitimising vigilantism. This has institutionalised socio-religious intolerance and violent extremism, and encouraged the spread of certain religious ideas in society such as blasphemy, apostasy, jihad and martyrdom, transforming the otherwise moderate fabric of Pakistani society. Moreover, the absolutist and exclusionary tendencies within (Sunni) Islam have had a divisive and authoritarian effect on Pakistan’s polity. The fallout within the country has been devastating, as witnessed in the lynching of blasphemy suspects, sectarian killings, the sacking of localities with minority populations, murder of human rights’ activists and the bombing of religious processions and places of worship. At this juncture, religious intolerance across Pakistan has reached unprecedented levels. Weak governance, widespread grievances, repression and the lack of a flourishing civil society have exacerbated the challenge. Hard choices have to be made to combat and reverse the mindset and ideology of those who are defying the state, and attempt to impose their narrow worldview under the garb of Islam. A Turkish proverb says that one bad lesson is better than 1,000 good advices. One can only hope that, having made bad choices in the past, the Pakistani establishment will know better and manage the danger of extremism through deliberation and persuasion rather than relying entirely on a military solution. The state should resist the temptation to define ‘God-fearing, good Muslims’. It must accept that the mixing of state and religion has been counter-productive. Rather than imposing Islamic law, what is needed is a spiritual and cultural path that fosters ethics in society rather than a theocratic state. Pakistan can learn from the success of multi-religious societies that advocate a secular democracy incorporating a strong policy of religious pluralism.