Pakistan and India: the dance of ruin

Pakistan and India once again are at loggerheads. This seems to be one of the bleakest and darkest phases in the 70-year history of mutual conflict. What is most depressing is that there isn’t any way out. The two countries appear locked in a dance of ruin, hell-bent on destroying one another in a slow process of attrition. Rabid nationalism, unimaginative leadership and sensationalist journalism have stoked popular resentments. This is robbing the scores of exploited and poor people in Pakistan and India the hope of a better and secure future. Both countries share responsibility for what has developed into one of the most adversarial, belligerent and intractable international relationships of modern times. Apart from the perennial issue of Kashmir, Pakistan and India have polluted their relationship by projecting each other as public enemy number one. Statesmanship is on hold as bellicose rhetoric and brinkmanship takes centrestage. It is discouraging to witness the delirious enthusiasm of armchair warriors on the possibility of a decisive conflict between the two countries. Such a conflict may involve a calamitous nuclear exchange, assuring mutual destruction. In Pakistan, security policy drives overall foreign policy rather than the other way round. Historically, fragile civilian governments have allowed the military establishment to exercise control over foreign policy, especially the relationship with India. The elected leadership is unable to formulate policies that promote peace and regional integration. Moreover, nuclear protection has allowed hawks in Pakistan to provoke localised conflicts involving lesser arms against India. Furthermore, Narendra Modi’s ascension to power and his aggressive projection of India’s rising political influence, economic and military prowess has heightened Pakistan’s insecurities. Nevertheless, a recent positive development in Pakistan is the growing awareness of the dangers of coddling non-state jihadist groups. In India, terrorist attacks attributed to Pakistan based groups have quite understandably generated fear and hatred. Clearly, India has every right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks. But building walls between states and peoples while psychologically reassuring do not solve problems. Moreover, launching public diplomacy campaigns that entirely focus on isolating Pakistan for abetting cross-border terrorism is counter-productive. Pakistan and India would be better served by a common front against terrorism, which continues to be responsible for blood and tears in both countries. This approach could better combat the unending cycle of provocation and response. Despite the shared animosity, the two neighbours, unable to change geography, are destined to live together. They cannot avoid continuing their turbulent negotiations, interactions and engagements. However, any problem-solving dialogue has to be based on a positive-sum approach where the two countries must compromise by acknowledging each other’s concerns and demands. By making these kinds of adjustments, the dialogue partners can avoid stumbling into war. Dialogue is also a process that takes time and in which continuity is necessary. The first step to resolve any form of conflict is to manage the conflict-resolution process itself. The starting point in any peace process is that both sides recognise existing ground realities, strengths and weaknesses and limits of flexibility, which are prerequisites to effective negotiation and relationship building. While there is little doubt that the power equation in South Asia has permanently shifted in India’s favour, a nuclear-armed Pakistan cannot be easily isolated. Pakistan can count on its ‘strategic’ partnership with China, the world’s second power with its expanding economic influence and military might. However, from previous examples in its troubled history, it would be a mistake for Pakistan to shape its relationship with India exclusively around an unsustainable arms race, costly nuclear deterrence or a single strategic partnership. Pakistan requires a broader engagement with India more than just convincing its larger neighbour that terrorism is a common threat, and that the Kashmir issue needs to be resolved to defeat terrorism. On the other hand, although India would be pleased to see a demilitarised Pakistan it would not be comfortable with a failed state as a neighbour. This could impact India’s own progress and prosperity. Indian policy makers probably realise that in aspiring to become a global power, India will have to shoulder greater responsibilities. This greater responsibility includes encouraging coexistence with Pakistan, and not the destruction of a smaller neighbour. On Kashmir, it is obvious that the present Line of Control is something that all parties to the dispute will have to accept sooner or later. India needs to improve the appalling conditions in Kashmir and grant its people greater autonomy, while Pakistan has to give up its fantasy of seizing the territory. Overall, Pakistan and India have a huge stake in maintaining stability and security in South Asia. Both countries retain the right to defend their national security interests. But their policies must equally reflect a basic harmony with the core values prevalent in today’s international community. These pertain to the wish of establishing international coalitions through collective diplomacy, joint struggle against international terror, aspirations for regional cooperation, respect for human rights and rejection of hegemony in any form.