Chasing a mirage

After 35 years of civil war and 15 years of the US led-intervention, prospects for peace in Afghanistan are bleak. The much- touted Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process is a mirage. It is apparent that the vicious cycle of violence will continue unabated for the foreseeable future. The recent death of the Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Pakistan seems inconsequential. The Taliban are not wilting under the pressure enough to bring them to the negotiating table. Overall, the balance of power remains unchanged and the military status quo persists. The principal reason that peace in not on the cards in Afghanistan are the divergent goals and objectives of the warring parties and the external players involved in the conflict. For instance, Pakistan’s incomprehensible Afghan policy is a serious impediment to bringing peace to Afghanistan. In a nutshell, Pakistani is fine with the joys of Taliban rule in Afghanistan but does not want the same for itself. It is opposed to the enforcement of harsh Taliban religious laws in Pakistan but quite satisfied if they are imposed in Afghanistan. It battles the Pakistan Taliban, but provides safe haven and logistical support to its ideological cousin, the Afghan Taliban. It whines over lost sovereignty when the US frustrated with the lack of success in the peace talks takes out a Taliban leader on its territory. Clearly, confidence-building measures and incentives will not bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. They are unlikely to renounce their objective of regaining political power and territorial control. The Taliban underpinned by a hard-line ideology are on a quest to re-establish the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. Sharing political power in a democratic system would be an anathema and would dilute support for the movement. Therefore, it is imperative that other parties particularly Pakistan do more to end Taliban intransigence. At this moment, there is a glaring lack of trust between the purported allies Pakistan and the US, who are the main external players in the Afghan conflict. Neither the US’s fight-talk nor Pakistan’s talk-talk strategies seem to be working in Afghanistan. The US strategy seeks to weaken the Taliban sufficiently to allow the Afghan people to safely reject it; develop Afghan security forces so that Afghans can defend themselves as US troops leave; and, through an enhanced civilian effort, help the Afghan government sustain the support of its people by providing basic services. However, the Taliban have been resilient, reminding one of the Viet Cong in Indo-China, as they keep coming back despite heavy losses and technological disadvantages. The Taliban strategy of wearing down the enemy and re-capturing lost territory, even holding it for short periods, seems to be working. On the other hand, the National Unity Government led by Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah appears weak. The government is dogged by allegations of corruption and incompetence. It is sincere and anxious to make peace but it cannot seem to get rid of the tag of being a US ‘puppet’. It can try to do all it can to create an environment conducive to reconciliation. But as long as the Taliban sense that government will collapse once the US leaves they will play the wait-and-see game. For obvious security reasons, government cannot agree to the Taliban’s main precondition for peace talks, which is the complete withdrawal of US-led foreign forces from Afghanistan. Many Afghans would oppose a return to harsh Taliban rule despite the shortcomings of the Ghani government. Some progress has been made on women’s rights, freedom of expression, education and democratic values that the Taliban do not share. Under the Taliban rule, girls were prohibited from attending school; women were entirely shunned from public life; boys were forbidden to play sports; music was banned. To paraphrase the author John Steinbeck, “All conflict is a symptom of man’s failure as a thinking animal.” In Afghanistan, all parties must think their way out of the quagmire. Some obvious approaches come to mind: 1) All countries agree to act against the common threat emanating from the network of like-minded terrorist groups in the region 2) Pakistan is persuaded to dropping the Taliban as a useful hedge in a post-US Afghanistan 3) the US accepts an Afghan government that incorporates the Taliban 4) Afghanistan ensures that its territory is not used against its neighbours 5) Political reforms in Afghanistan grant a greater voice to a broader range of Afghan interests, such as local and provincial leaders, political parties, and parliament. The Afghan government needs a wider base of political support than it currently enjoys and its institutions are able to deliver 6) Taliban are convinced that their dream of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan is unrealistic and will remain unfulfilled. It should be made clear to the Taliban that if they persist in their campaign, they would face the full military might of Pakistan and the US on both sides of the porous border.

Pakistan and India: the dance of ruin

Pakistan and India once again are at loggerheads. This seems to be one of the bleakest and darkest phases in the 70-year history of mutual conflict. What is most depressing is that there isn’t any way out. The two countries appear locked in a dance of ruin, hell-bent on destroying one another in a slow process of attrition. Rabid nationalism, unimaginative leadership and sensationalist journalism have stoked popular resentments. This is robbing the scores of exploited and poor people in Pakistan and India the hope of a better and secure future. Both countries share responsibility for what has developed into one of the most adversarial, belligerent and intractable international relationships of modern times. Apart from the perennial issue of Kashmir, Pakistan and India have polluted their relationship by projecting each other as public enemy number one. Statesmanship is on hold as bellicose rhetoric and brinkmanship takes centrestage. It is discouraging to witness the delirious enthusiasm of armchair warriors on the possibility of a decisive conflict between the two countries. Such a conflict may involve a calamitous nuclear exchange, assuring mutual destruction. In Pakistan, security policy drives overall foreign policy rather than the other way round. Historically, fragile civilian governments have allowed the military establishment to exercise control over foreign policy, especially the relationship with India. The elected leadership is unable to formulate policies that promote peace and regional integration. Moreover, nuclear protection has allowed hawks in Pakistan to provoke localised conflicts involving lesser arms against India. Furthermore, Narendra Modi’s ascension to power and his aggressive projection of India’s rising political influence, economic and military prowess has heightened Pakistan’s insecurities. Nevertheless, a recent positive development in Pakistan is the growing awareness of the dangers of coddling non-state jihadist groups. In India, terrorist attacks attributed to Pakistan based groups have quite understandably generated fear and hatred. Clearly, India has every right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks. But building walls between states and peoples while psychologically reassuring do not solve problems. Moreover, launching public diplomacy campaigns that entirely focus on isolating Pakistan for abetting cross-border terrorism is counter-productive. Pakistan and India would be better served by a common front against terrorism, which continues to be responsible for blood and tears in both countries. This approach could better combat the unending cycle of provocation and response. Despite the shared animosity, the two neighbours, unable to change geography, are destined to live together. They cannot avoid continuing their turbulent negotiations, interactions and engagements. However, any problem-solving dialogue has to be based on a positive-sum approach where the two countries must compromise by acknowledging each other’s concerns and demands. By making these kinds of adjustments, the dialogue partners can avoid stumbling into war. Dialogue is also a process that takes time and in which continuity is necessary. The first step to resolve any form of conflict is to manage the conflict-resolution process itself. The starting point in any peace process is that both sides recognise existing ground realities, strengths and weaknesses and limits of flexibility, which are prerequisites to effective negotiation and relationship building. While there is little doubt that the power equation in South Asia has permanently shifted in India’s favour, a nuclear-armed Pakistan cannot be easily isolated. Pakistan can count on its ‘strategic’ partnership with China, the world’s second power with its expanding economic influence and military might. However, from previous examples in its troubled history, it would be a mistake for Pakistan to shape its relationship with India exclusively around an unsustainable arms race, costly nuclear deterrence or a single strategic partnership. Pakistan requires a broader engagement with India more than just convincing its larger neighbour that terrorism is a common threat, and that the Kashmir issue needs to be resolved to defeat terrorism. On the other hand, although India would be pleased to see a demilitarised Pakistan it would not be comfortable with a failed state as a neighbour. This could impact India’s own progress and prosperity. Indian policy makers probably realise that in aspiring to become a global power, India will have to shoulder greater responsibilities. This greater responsibility includes encouraging coexistence with Pakistan, and not the destruction of a smaller neighbour. On Kashmir, it is obvious that the present Line of Control is something that all parties to the dispute will have to accept sooner or later. India needs to improve the appalling conditions in Kashmir and grant its people greater autonomy, while Pakistan has to give up its fantasy of seizing the territory. Overall, Pakistan and India have a huge stake in maintaining stability and security in South Asia. Both countries retain the right to defend their national security interests. But their policies must equally reflect a basic harmony with the core values prevalent in today’s international community. These pertain to the wish of establishing international coalitions through collective diplomacy, joint struggle against international terror, aspirations for regional cooperation, respect for human rights and rejection of hegemony in any form.

The fragile foundations of democracy

Arguably, the inability to build a forward-looking or modern political system has contributed greatly to the civilisational decline of Muslims. Currently, many Muslim countries remain authoritarian states devoid of transparency, rule of law, an independent judiciary, fully contested political pluralism, freedom of expression, press and the media, and an institutionalised separation of civilian and military rule as the latter continues to intervene in governmental decision-making and is unaccountable to elected civilian leaders. The democratic vacuum engenders despotism, fanaticism and misery, which today threaten the wider world. Indeed, Winston Churchill’s famous metaphor about dictators riding on tigers encapsulates the entire politics of significant swathes of the Muslim world. The tigers are a symbol for the people whom the dictators rule. The dictators use them as if they were beasts of burden. But unlike horses or mules, a tiger can kill and eat a human, so Churchill was saying that the oppressed people will rise up and overthrow the dictators. Hopes soared five years ago when a wave of unrest across the region led to the overthrow of four dictators — in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen — and to a clamour for change elsewhere, notably in Syria. But the Arab Spring’s fruit has rotted into renewed autocracy and war. Why key Muslim countries have so miserably failed to establish democracy, happiness or (aside from the windfall of oil) wealth for their people is one of the important questions of our time. What makes Muslim societies vulnerable to odious regimes and extremists bent on destroying them (and their perceived allies in the west)? Part of the answer certainly lies in the fact that the preconditions for democracy are lacking in the Muslim world. Monarchs, generals and clerics have stymied political evolution by emasculating the news media, suppressing intellectual inquiry, restricting artistic expression, banning political parties and co-opting regional, ethnic and religious organisations to silence dissenting voices. Moreover, existing feudalism, tribalism and traditionalism in Muslim societies tend to divide and destroy. These factors are major stumbling blocks to accommodating popular aspirations. Furthermore, regressive reinterpretations of Islam are at the core of some of the deep troubles in the Muslim world today. The claim, promoted by many of the leading lights in Islam, to combine spiritual and earthly authority, with no separation of mosque and state, has stunted the development of free political institutions. But the inadequacies of Muslim civil societies also have historical causes that transcend the policies of present dictators. Before the establishment of colonial regimes in the late 19th century, Muslim rulers enjoyed absolute power. With the connivance of pliant ulema (religious scholars), Muslim rulers hindered the development of autonomous and self-governing private organisations. Such a political setting prevented democratic institutions from taking root and ultimately facilitated the rise of current Muslim dictatorships. Many Muslim religious scholars and jurists refer to positive forms of democracy as Islamic democracy. On the other hand, they regard forms of irreligious or liberal ‘western’ democracy as evil ideologies, advising Muslims that they are religiously obliged to fight those kinds of secular principles and ideas. These scholars believe that, at the core of all kinds of racism, colonialism, communism and western capitalism, the dominant common ideological factor is anti-religious secularism. This spurious distinction between good and bad democracy serves as fodder for Muslim extremists in their relentless battle against ‘corrupt and hated’ western ideologies. The contempt for liberal democratic values is one more reason why Muslim countries have not yet succeeded in fostering the institutional prerequisites of democracy: the give-and-take of parliamentary discourse, protection for minorities, the emancipation of women, a free press, independent courts, universities and trade unions. Democracy requires checks and balances, and it is largely through civil society that citizens protect their rights as individuals, force policy makers to accommodate their interests and limit abuses of state authority. Civil society also promotes a culture of bargaining and gives future leaders the skills to articulate ideas, form coalitions and govern. Regrettably, Muslim civil society remains shallow by world standards. This chronic weakness of civil society suggests that viable Muslim democracies — or the leaders who could govern them — will not emerge anytime soon. A stronger civil society alone will not bring about democracy. But without a strong civil society, dictators will yield power except in the face of foreign intervention. Another significant challenge to the establishment of democratic institutions in the Muslim world is the unwillingness of western powers, particularly the US, to seriously confront the effects of supporting Muslim dictatorships that enforce stability at the cost of democracy. Ultimately, this support buys friendship with no one because supporting autocrats to repress radicalism largely serves only to empower those same radicals. One cannot subscribe to the suggestion that Muslims, as a people, lack talent or suffer from some pathological antipathy to democracy. Pluralism, education, open markets, these were once Muslim values and they could be so again. But the Muslim world has yet to make its tortuous transition from arbitrary rule by dictators to the democratic rule of law. Replacing authoritarian political structures with workable, democratic institutions will require commitment and sacrifice.

Slide into extremism

Other countries that are divided by religious extremism can learn from Pakistan that entrenching religious dogmatism and intransigence has devastating consequences for a country’s future. Once bigotry becomes institutionalised, reversing it is no easy endeavour, particularly in the face of violent opposition. Society is easily manipulated by those who want to impose their own views in the name of religion. It has been suggested that extremism in Pakistan is a natural consequence of the mobilisation of broad support for a separate state from a religious platform, using the rhetoric of secularism and democracy but relying on the symbols of Islam to invoke support for an avowedly Muslim state, founded by Muslims for Muslims. But more likely, extremism has more to do with the poor choices made since the country’s creation: lack of consensus around national identity, deviation from the early moderate path to nation building and overemphasis on the public role for religion in state and social affairs at the expense of pluralism and democracy. Certainly, the role of religion in political and civil life has had a defining role in the political development of the nation. Had there been less emphasis on religion from the ruling, elite-dominated state in Pakistan, the public and religious groups would not have become vociferous in demanding the establishment of a theocratic state. And religious groups and parties would not have gained so much street power and public exposure. The roots of state support for Islamist policies can be traced back to the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which created the union between religion and state. It was followed by the 1956 Constitution that stated that the president of the country must be a Muslim and that no law in the country could be passed that goes against the teachings of the Holy Quran and sunnah. The 1962 Constitution established the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a body that states that child marriages are not un-Islamic, speaks out against the Domestic Violence Bill and does not support seeking consent from the first wife when it comes to a second marriage. Furthermore, the creation in 1980 of the Federal Sharia Court institutionalised Islamic tenets and laid the foundations for theocratic rule in the country. With state support, this body used its religious authority to examine existing Pakistani laws for their obedience to Islamic teachings. Consequently, the culture of Islamisation and adherence to an exclusive identity of Islam pervades Pakistani political and social institutions. Moreover, between 1980 and 1986, there were amendments to the blasphemy laws that originated in British-controlled India in 1860 to deter the religious persecution of heterogeneous groups. These laws are inherently biased and discriminatory, have induced sectarian violence and have silenced honest political discourse in the country. These laws continue to permit shocking abuses against minorities as well as worsen radicalisation. Militant groups exploit these draconian laws to legitimise their moral authority and galvanise flourishing conservative Islamic groups already sympathetic to the jihadi cause. More importantly, the laws run contrary to the spirit of justice and respect towards other faiths under the precepts of Islam. Unfortunately, the state is scared to repeal these highly politicised laws anticipating a volatile backlash by conservatives. This could bolster the legitimacy of militant religious groups. In summary, egregious laws, state abdication and connivance have kindled the fire of extremism and undermine judicial authority by legitimising vigilantism. This has institutionalised socio-religious intolerance and violent extremism, and encouraged the spread of certain religious ideas in society such as blasphemy, apostasy, jihad and martyrdom, transforming the otherwise moderate fabric of Pakistani society. Moreover, the absolutist and exclusionary tendencies within (Sunni) Islam have had a divisive and authoritarian effect on Pakistan’s polity. The fallout within the country has been devastating, as witnessed in the lynching of blasphemy suspects, sectarian killings, the sacking of localities with minority populations, murder of human rights’ activists and the bombing of religious processions and places of worship. At this juncture, religious intolerance across Pakistan has reached unprecedented levels. Weak governance, widespread grievances, repression and the lack of a flourishing civil society have exacerbated the challenge. Hard choices have to be made to combat and reverse the mindset and ideology of those who are defying the state, and attempt to impose their narrow worldview under the garb of Islam. A Turkish proverb says that one bad lesson is better than 1,000 good advices. One can only hope that, having made bad choices in the past, the Pakistani establishment will know better and manage the danger of extremism through deliberation and persuasion rather than relying entirely on a military solution. The state should resist the temptation to define ‘God-fearing, good Muslims’. It must accept that the mixing of state and religion has been counter-productive. Rather than imposing Islamic law, what is needed is a spiritual and cultural path that fosters ethics in society rather than a theocratic state. Pakistan can learn from the success of multi-religious societies that advocate a secular democracy incorporating a strong policy of religious pluralism.

Civil-military imbalance

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) co-chairman and former president, Asif Zardari, recently accused the military establishment of overstepping its domain. Zardari faced a firestorm of criticism for implying that the generals separate themselves from politics and not interfere in civilian matters. His legitimate concerns were buried under sharp attacks on his and the PPP’s weaknesses, foibles and failings. Zardari did, however, manage to re-ignite the perennial debate on the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan. The spectre of military intervention always hangs over the country. It casts a permanent shadow of uncertainty over the democratic process. Several factors have contributed to skewed civil-military relations in Pakistan. These include an ineffectual political class and civil society with a limited understanding of democratic institutions and values. Moreover, there is little nationwide consensus on the role and mission of the military. Consequently, the political leadership has been unable to impose the supremacy of parliamentary politics over the military. The military is seen to be the only group capable of preserving political stability and order. This reinforces the perception that the remedy for all social and economic problems can be found in the officer corps rather than the politicians. Some even think that the military’s concept of ‘modernism’ as the sole direction for the country. Yet the military leadership, when it had a chance, failed to restructure the country’s political, social and economic life. In fact, the capability of the military institution to transform the state and society is grossly overestimated. Moreover, as dictatorships passed, their political and social machinations quickly unravelled, leaving a bitter and destructive legacy. For example, the Balochistan quagmire proves that military solutions to political problems do not work. Still, the hybrid model of market capitalism and authoritarian governance resonates with the self-styled Kemalists, Gaullists and Putinists among the chattering classes. It helps that authoritarianism is firmly imbedded in Pakistani society. It makes military interventions easier in political life, domestic and foreign affairs. The social and political structure is autocratic in character and functions from the top down. Backed by coercive sanctions, the military-led power elite exercises domineering power and influence over the country. At the same time, the missing attributes of statehood tempt a vacuum of authority and an imbalance of power internally. Parts of the country have witnessed bloody sectarian and ethnic conflict; religious militias and the powers backing them challenge state sovereignty at will, strengthening the perception of a failed state not able to control its own territory. The political space is a lair of conspiracies aimed at the country’s hopeful democracy. Democracy is blamed for not tackling important economic and security issues. The very nature of the democratic decision-making process is clogged by cosseted, vested interests and the endless obligation to consult ‘stakeholders’. At times, policies are watered down, ineffectual or counter-productive. Often, no decisions are made at all. Winston Churchill’s aphorism, that democracy is the worst system except for all others, is no consolation. But the problem does not appear to be democracy itself or that democracy is overrated. Democracies need people inherently reasonable and inclined towards peaceful compromise and common sense. Instead, citizens want more for less. They demand more of the state but are unwilling to give back much in return. They vote as narrow interest groups inviting politicians to pander to them. Elections are vaudeville shows in which an apathetic public requires titillation to tune in. The weak political culture allows politicians to be disengaged, reluctant to take risks and govern only at the margins. Democracy is set up to fail, overburdened with obligations that cannot be fulfilled. In addition, Pakistan’s nascent democracy must operate under the shadow of an ambitious military. However, turning the country over to the military, directly or indirectly, hardly appears to be the answer to broken dysfunctional governance. It seems too easy to blame the corruption and apathy of politicians entirely for everything that is wrong with Pakistan. The people remember past dictatorship years as a blur of bleakness. None delivered the promised economic miracle. They were unable to provide better hospitals and schools, a secure environment, cheaper electricity and new jobs. At times, the air was thick with fear, civil servants were arbitrarily dismissed from service for corruption and malfeasance, politicians and journalists imprisoned and executed, citizens flogged for not falling in line, a military vision that cast citizens as recalcitrant beasts to be whipped into shape. There was little improvement in the quality of governance or a reduction in corruption. Instead, the military’s professional duties suffered as it got mired in fixing civilian problems. Pakistan can derive strength from the presence of a well-trained and experienced military that is respected and funded by a civilian authority. The military should acknowledge the principle of civilian control, including the principle of political neutrality and non-partisanship of the armed forces. Democratic control should always be a two-way process between the armed forces and society. Firm constitutional guarantees should protect the state — including the armed forces — from two types of potential dangers: from politicians, who have military ambitions, and from a military with political ambitions.

The Pak US conundrum

Charles de Gaulle once said “You may be sure that the Americans will commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are beyond imagination”. Well, the “stupid” Americans spearheaded the liberation of France, allowed the Free French Army to lead the march into Paris contributing to De Gaulle being declared a national hero eventually becoming President of France.

Similarly, the Americans have pumped over $ 45 billion in direct military and economic aid to Pakistan since Independence, $ 21 billion since 9/11 alone in effect making a huge contribution to stabilizing an impoverished nation. In return almost daily, Pakistani leaders like Imran Khan and Syed Munawar Hasan among others, accuse the United States at minimum of murder, genocide and meddling in internal affairs. This shows that stupidity is not restricted to a particular nation or people.

To be sure Americans are not saints and have committed their share of stupid acts all over the world including in Pakistan, latest being the alleged murder of three Pakistani citizens in Lahore by “Rambo” Davis and his support team. We also know that previous American support for military dictatorships in Pakistan has contributed to weaknesses in the country’s civilian democratic institutions arguably better placed to fight intolerance and extremism.

Perhaps both Pakistan and the United States need to reconsider their bilateral relations in context of Mr. M.A. Jinnah’s broadcast talk to the people of the USA in February 1948 when he said: Our foreign policy is one of the friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings, and are prepared to make our contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I think that a great deal of the mistrust and animosity between Pakistan and the United States stem from cultural differences exacerbated by poor communication which sometimes leads to serious misunderstandings. It would be fair to say that Pakistanis are an overly emotional and sensitive people for whom the Americans can come across as insensitive and overbearing! The fact that Pakistan is an economic basket case and reliance on US aid to stay afloat will always mean an unequal partnership heavily skewed in favour of the United States.

I am reminded of an amusing incident when in the early 60s, US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) on a goodwill mission visited Karachi and met Bashir Ahmad in a group of camel drivers on a roadside. LBJ pressed the flesh even patting the camels and used a phrase he had regularly said in his travels, “You all come to Washington and see us sometime” but was completely surprised when Bashir accepted his offer. With the press hot on his heels after the acceptance, LBJ took advantage of the People-to-People program to fund Bashir’s travel expenses.

Evidently, President Kennedy (JFK) jokingly noted about the visit, “I don’t know how Lyndon does it. If I had done that, there would have been camel dung all over the White House lawn.” This “politically incorrect” remark from JFK would have caused a furor in Pakistan today!

A Pakistani journalist covering Bashir’s US visit described it as “don’t conquer a country, don’t conquer a government. If you wish to conquer, conquer the hearts of the people.” Finally, at the end of his stay, as a gesture of further goodwill, LBJ made arrangements for Bashir to visit Mecca on his way back to Pakistan, this act of friendship apparently bought tears to the eyes of the destitute camel driver.

Well in the present charged environment, the Americans can’t hope to “conquer the hearts” of the people of Pakistan. LBJ’s charming Southern drawl and nice gestures may have worked in Bashir’s naïve Pakistan of the 60s but it is impossible to see similar gestures working on a suspicious and insecure Pakistani populace of today.

So let’s agree that Pakistan and the United States can’t be friends but have only shared interests. Firstly, that the ISI fully cooperate with the CIA in the joint fight against disrupting international terrorism and arresting and interrogating terrorist suspects, nicely as possible please!

In return, the US should recognize Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and accept the fact that the Pakistan army can’t be seen to be a glorified regional police force for the US military.
Secondly, the US should strongly encourage India Pakistan dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue and jumpstart trade between the two countries. Genuine peace efforts and trade will hopefully shape the psyche of the Pakistani ruling-elite and intelligentsia away from a costly arms race towards investment in education, health and welfare.

Finally, support for democracy in Pakistan should be the cornerstone of US foreign policy. No more should the United States be identified with supporting dictators for short term expediency. In turn, Pakistani democratic governments should guarantee the rule of law, an end to corruption and economic growth and progress for all. Hopefully, over time these shared interests will lead to a reduction in frictions between Pakistan and the United States.

Does America Suffer From Solution-ism?

Does America suffer from Solution-ism? by Saad Hafiz

America suffers from ‘solutionism’", an ex-Marine running a Washington law practice resignedly remarked to me at a Conference in Vermont recently. We were talking about how America was embroiled in conflict resolution and nation building around the world with few results to show for it; while serious problems like leadership gridlock and fiscal deficits were festering at home.

Solutionism means that for every intractable problem there is logical and available answer. H.L. Mencken, the American journalist and humorist said "for every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong". Increasingly, in the last few decades, the buzz word in America has been "solutions". Every problem has an easily attainable outcome that is nicely packaged and sold to the public-little attention is paid to the problems.

Many Americans are questioning that while the U.S. economy is in the doldrums, the government continues to engage in bitter partisanship while losing voter confidence. The political elite ignores the widening wealth gap, the suffering of tens of millions on food stamps, while U.S. leaders continue to "spread democracy" with troops, drones and righteous lectures to other countries on how to be like America.

I am reminded of a conversation with an American investment professional before the Second Gulf War in 2003 just as President George W. Bush was preparing to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Responding to my concern on where the US intervention in Iraq would lead, the individual, brimming with pride, said with absolute certitude that the U.S. could do anything including reshaping the Middle East to introduce freedom and democracy.

He cited how America had successfully transformed German and Japanese societies after World War II from fascism and militarism to freedom and democracy. It is clear however that conditions were vastly different after World War II that they are today. America enjoyed nearly unlimited power in the post war era to influence outcomes in the Free World. This mentality is still around, despite the reality that many solutions like regime change in Iraq have cost upwards of three trillion dollars and thousands of American and Iraqi lives thus far and whose benefits to America have yet to be realized.

American solutionism was satirized in The Ugly American, a 1950’s best selling political novel about Sarkhan, a fictional Southeast Asian country. The novel was later made into a movie starring the late Marlon Brando. The American officials are shown as overwhelmingly arrogant, rude, and incompetent. The reader wonders, who needs an enemy like communism, when you are already your own worst enemy?

A Catholic priest from Boston name Father Finian is assigned to Sarkhan. Unlike American officials, Father Finian says to the people "it is your country, your souls, your lives… I will do what we agree upon." In contrast, American "experts" who were full of ideas from their experiences back home offered to improve the quality of local chickens and increase the chickens’ egg yield when locals were only interested in developing canals and mechanized farms. The tone deaf nature and lack of local knowledge not only handicapped the expert’s ability to actively engage the local population; it actively undermined their ability to determine their own political, economic, and social stability in the future.

Amusing fiction aside, the most devastating consequence of American solutionism is Pakistan, where for over 60 years, America has endeavored to create a strong, democratic ally by doling out billions of dollars in economic and military aid, only to watch with horror as it emerged as one of the most virulently anti-American countries in the world and seen as a covert sponsor of terror. Instead of being grateful, many Pakistanis deride America, questioning its motives for involvement in the country. America’s argument that it is fulfilling its responsibility as the leading global power to ensure that Pakistan does not implode does not convince Pakistanis.

What can the U.S. do to replace the unbridled unilateral solutionism despised by many? While isolationism is certainly not the answer, America needs to explain its motives more clearly. Also, a bit of Father Finian’s advice to "do what we all agree upon" might help. But above all America must realize that a lack of specific solutions on the horizon is not necessarily a cause for despair as it may be the beginning of true realism in American foreign policy.